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Post-Trial Plea Bargaining and
Predictive Analytics in Public Law
Harold J. Krent*
Abstract
Adam Gershowitz’s article calling for post-trial plea
bargaining in capital cases reasons that governors should
commute sentences to life in prison, in exceptional cases, to limit
the costs of protracted post-trial litigation over imposition of the
death penalty. The commutation power, in his view, resembles
pre-trial plea bargaining in that both the state and the criminal
defendant can benefit—the state saves resources while the
defendant gets off death row.
Gershowitz’s article, therefore, affords a window into the
increasing use of predictive analytics in deciding whether to bring
or resolve litigation. Sifting through data on all prior capital cases
can yield clues as to the likelihood of success or the length of
litigation in future capital cases. Not surprisingly, the past can, to
some extent, help us predict the future and thereby inform the
governor’s commutation decision.
Deployment of predictive analytics is more familiar in the
private sector. The life insurance industry historically is
predicated on actuarial science, and credit card companies rely on
complex data to score riskiness of a loan or to detect fraud. Even
sports teams follow a “Moneyball” approach to drafting and
acquiring the best talent possible based on prior data.
Gershowitz’s article presages the role that predictive analytics
will play in the public sector, saving vast resources and limiting
subjectivity in governmental decision-making. Reliance on prior
data can help determine when the government should settle torts
cases, pay Veterans claims, and subject those receiving disability
to review to determine if their disability continues. Predictive
analytics may also help the IRS streamline tax auditing and
* Dean & Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Tech.
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collection. On the other hand, unlike in private law, individuated
decision-making may be required by the government either under
the Constitution or legislative directives. Moreover, the
government’s consideration of historical factors correlated with
protected categories such as race may result, on occasion, in
discrimination when reliance on the prior data culminates in
denial of a benefit or increased punishment. As with any other
technological breakthrough, predictive analytics as applied to the
public sector brings tremendous promise but concerns as well.
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Introduction
Adam Gershowitz’s article calling for post-trial plea
bargaining in capital cases persuasively argues that the costs of
protracted post-trial litigation over imposition of the death
penalty1 can exceed the benefits of such litigation in upholding
the integrity of the criminal justice system, regardless of one’s
moral views of the death penalty. Gershowitz relays that states
are spending millions of dollars in litigation of capital cases that
do not result in execution of those convicted, either because
courts overturn the sentence or because the defendants die
awaiting outcome of the lengthy litigation.2 He argues that, when
1. Gershowtiz reports that there is an average of fifteen years between
sentence and execution. Adam Gershowitz, Post-Trial Plea Bargaining in
Capital Cases: Using Conditional Clemency to Remove Weak Cases from Death
Row, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1359, 1361 n.4 (2016).
2. Id. at 1361.
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indicators arise post-trial that litigation will be arduous and sap
the resources of state litigators, governors should commute the
death sentence to life in prison. Gershowitz uses the examples of
a dissent on a state appellate court panel3 or discrediting of an
expert who earlier testified at the sentencing phase as signals to
a governor that subsequent litigation would not be worth the
cost.4
Plea bargaining post trial differs in several important
respects from pre-trial plea bargaining. Principally, if the
litigation only focuses on the capital sentencing hearing, then the
defendant almost assuredly will accept a commutation to life in
prison and, indeed, the Supreme Court in Biddle v. Perovich5 held
that the individual in such contexts has no choice but to accept
the commutation, presumably on the ground that the defendant
cannot insist upon his or her own death.6 So, in much of the
litigation over capital sentencing, the plea bargain analogy is
inapt because the defendant is not relinquishing any rights. If the
litigation instead focuses on the validity of some aspect of the
conviction for the capital offense, then the analogy holds. The
defendant’s “chip” in that instance would be to agree to halt the
ongoing litigation. Depending on risk aversion and likelihood of
success, a defendant would consent to the commutation in
exchange for dropping litigation that might result in a lesser
sentence. From the governor’s perspective, plea bargaining post
trial differs as well, because a commutation to life in prison
3. Id. at 1387.
4. Id. at 1388.
5. 274 U.S. 480 (1927).
6. See id. at 488 (“Supposing that Perovich did not accept the change, he
could not have got himself hanged against the Executive order. Supposing that
he did accept, he could not affect the judgment to be carried out.”). In
non-capital contexts, offenders remain free to reject offers of commutation, as
Oscar Lopez Rivera, a former leader of the FALN—a Puerto Rican terrorist
organization—demonstrated by rejecting President Clinton’s offer to commute
his sentence on the condition that he renounce terrorism. President Obama
subsequently, and perhaps surprisingly, commuted his sentence without any
condition. Charles Lane, Forget Chelsea Manning. This is the Obama Pardon
You
Should
be
Mad
About.,
WASH. POST.
(Jan.
18,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/forget-chelsea-manning-this-is-theobama-pardon-you-should-be-mad-about/2017/01/ 18/1b3c8b6a-ddb0-11e6-ad42f3375f271c9c_story.html?utm_term=.27ad7e6de5 bf (last visited Feb. 9, 2017)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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substantially reduces the potential, as in a typical plea bargain
case, that a light sentence will result in the defendant offending
again. Nonetheless, as Gershowitz notes, political costs still
remain because of the potentially adverse public reaction.7
Yet, despite the imperfect analogy to plea bargaining,
Gershowitz is correct that governors can use the commutation
power to preserve litigation resources.8 Gershowitz’s article
therefore affords a window into the increasing use of predictive
analytics in deciding whether to bring or resolve litigation.
Sifting through data on all prior capital cases can yield clues as to
the likelihood of success or the length of litigation in future
capital cases. Not surprisingly, the past can, to some extent, help
us predict the future. Gershowitz’s example of the dissenting
judge can be calculated nationally in an effort to determine the
number of years of litigation and ultimate outcome after a dissent
in a death penalty case.9 Similarly, governors can calculate the
effect when an expert who testified at a sentencing hearing
subsequently is discredited. The more factors that can be
calculated, the more accurate the picture likely will be.10 In the
pretrial plea bargaining context prosecutors often can assess the
likelihood of particular sentences based on the evidence they have
amassed, including age of offender, crime charged, potential
application of sentencing guidelines and past practices of judges
before whom they are likely to appear. Reliance on such data will
minimize the potential for inconsistent plea bargaining decisions
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and even from prosecutor to
prosecutor.

7. See Gershowitz, supra note 1, at 1371–72 (describing how politicians,
particularly those with presidential aspirations, must maintain a reputation as
“tough on crime”). In addition, the governor’s frequent use of the commutation
power might undermine the morale of the state’s litigation team.
8. See id. at 1362 (noting that some states are spending millions of dollars
in these capital cases). Gershowitz does not factor in the countervailing costs of
incarceration for life.
9. See id. at 1387 (“So, how would governors know which cases to
commute? . . . Governors could simply have their legal counsel read and analyze
the dissenting opinions to see if they find the dissenting opinions convincing.”).
10. Unless the system is too complex, in which relevant factors cannot be
extracted. See infra Parts I–II (describing the difficulty of determining relevant
factors in the current system).
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Deployment of predictive analytics is more familiar in the
private sector. The life insurance industry historically is
predicated on actuarial science, and companies today rely on data
harvested from their files recording what type of car was involved
in a crash, how old were the drivers and passengers, what type of
injury was reported, the jurisdiction in which the crash took place
and so on to determine whether to settle and if so how much to
offer. Bank and credit card companies rely on complex data to
score riskiness of a loan or to detect fraud. Marketing firms mine
date and look for patterns to predict the purchasing behavior of
consumers. Indeed, “Moneyball” has captured the attention of the
public.11 Reliance on such data can be cost effective, while
limiting subjectivity of the decision-maker.
Predictive analytics is also a familiar, if not fully examined,
part of our national security strategy. Surveillance is predicated
on the possibility that individuals who visit particular locales,
call certain phone numbers and/or visit certain websites pose a
risk to public safety. The No-Fly List is based on similar
analytics.12 Predictive policing aims analogously to prevent
crimes before they happen.13
11. Ken Krogue, Brad Pitt, Oakland Athletics, and Moneyball: Still the
Model for Change Management, Business Transformation and Predictive
Analytics,
FORBES
(July
15,
2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenkrogue/2014/07/15/brad-pitt-oakland-athleticsand-moneyball-still-the-model-for-change-management-businesstransformation-and-predictive-analytics/#620f36ac1753 (last visited Feb. 9,
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Michael Schrage,
What a Minor League Moneyball Can Teach about Predictive Analytics, HARV.
BUS. REV. (May 26, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/05/what-a-minor-leaguemoneyball-reveals-about-predictive-analytics (last visited Feb. 9, 2016) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, No-Fly List Uses Predictive Assessments,
SCHNEIER
ON
SECURITY
(Aug.
20,
2015),
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/08/no-fly_list_use.html (last visited
Feb. 9, 2017) (noting that the U.S. government has admitted to its use of
predictive assessments when deciding whether an individual should be on the
no-fly list) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. See, e.g., Mara Hvistendahl, Can ‘Predictive Policing’ Prevent Crime
Before
it
Happens?,
SCIENCE
(Sept.
28,
2016),
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/09/can-predictive-policing-prevent-crimeit-happens (last visited Feb. 9, 2017) (describing how the new “predictive
policing” program will use police car laptops to “display maps showing locations
where crime is likely to occur, based on data-crunching algorithms developed by
scientists . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Gershowitz’s article presages the role that predictive
analytics will play in more routine public sector contexts. In the
pages that follow, I take tentative steps to chart the conditions
under which the use of predictive analytics should be encouraged
in public law.14 As with any other technological breakthrough,
predictive analytics as applied to legal decision-making brings
tremendous promise but some concerns as well.
I. Sufficiency of Data
As the concept of quantitative legal prediction itself suggests,
predictive analytics cannot work without sufficient information.
For the No-Fly List, the data sifted was, reportedly, enormous,15
and the data set for predictive policing is also robust.16 Tax
authorities can probe millions of records to create an algorithm to
detect tax avoidance schemes. Consider, as well, a leading article
that focuses on securities fraud litigation in the federal courts,
assessing a variety of factors to determine the likelihood that a
case will settle and the amount of that settlement.17 The
researchers examined 1200 cases and inputted data based on
identity of the parties, the defendant’s stock market performance,
the circuit in which the case was filed, and the nature of the
alleged wrongdoing, among other factors. The twelve hundred
cases assured a significant enough data set to make successful
prediction. The algorithm cannot function if the data points are
too disparate. Certainly, the approximately 8,000 death sentences
cited by Gershowitz present sufficient data from which to draw
14. For a more sophisticated assessment in the legal services sector, see
generally Daniel M. Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction–Or—How I Learned to
Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal
Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909 (2013) (discussing the various
technological advances that may push the legal services sector towards data
driven analysis).
15. Schneier, supra note 12.
16. See Hvistendahl, supra note 13 (“[P]olice departments were catching up
in data collection, making crime forecasting a ‘real possibility rather than just a
theoretical novelty,’ . . . .”). .
17. See generally Blakeley B. McShane, Oliver Watson, Tom Baker and
Sean Griffith, Predicting Securities Fraud Settlements and Amounts: A
Hierarchical Bayesian Model of Federal Securities Class Action Lawsuits, 9 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 482 (2012).
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factors such as duration of litigation and ultimate outcome.18 Of
the 8,000 individuals sentenced to death, Gershowtiz reports that
less than twenty percent have been executed.19
On the other hand, there may be insufficient instances in
the post-trial death sentence context in which an expert is
disqualified or state appellate judge dissents to create a
meaningful information set. The available data may not permit a
governor to make a cost-benefit analysis of when to commute a
death sentence in light of a prediction of litigation costs.
Predictions do not work if the data points are too isolated. In
contrast, insurance companies considering whether to settle cases
arising out of car crashes have a cornucopia of information on
which to rely, as do banks in considering whether to make a loan.
Predictive analytics depends on sufficient data.
II. Relevance of Data Studied
Before 2016, every time that the National League won the
seventh game of a World Series in a presidential election year, a
Democrat was elected to the White House.20 That being said,
election campaigns would be foolish to rely on such data in
campaigning. Many correlations exist that may not be predictive.
Although the relevance of data may not be apparent from the
outset, decision-makers must be able to focus on relevant data to
make predictive analytics valuable.
One way to check against the use of irrelevant data in either
public or private law is to ensure that the predictive analytics are
constantly updated. Over time, relevant data likely will come to
the fore. In the securities fraud litigation example, most, but not
all, factors studied had predictive value,21 while a study of social
18. Gershowitz, supra note 1, at 1370–71.
19. Id.
20. Sports Indicators of Election Favor Hillary Clinton, But. . . , POSTGAME,
(Nov. 6, 2016), www.thepostgame.com/presidential-election-world-series-game7-redskins (last visited Feb. 9, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). At least that was true until the Cubs’ recent stirring victory.
21. See generally McShane, supra note 17, at 499–501; see also Daniel M.
Katz, Michael Bommarito & Josh Blackman, Predicting the Behavior of the
United States Supreme Court: A General Approach 4–5 (Jan. 16, 2017) (on file
with authors), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1612.03473.pdf.
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security disability litigation in federal courts concluded that
almost none of the many factors studied was salient.22
Moreover, some systems may be too complex to permit
isolation of relevant data. We may not have developed the tools to
select the variables that have predictive value in such complex
systems. For instance, weather more than ten days out remains
an enigma despite the best efforts of meteorologists.23
Post-trial plea bargaining takes place within a criminal
justice system that comparatively is simple enough to permit
drawing relevant data, and the factors of a dissenting judge and
discredited expert are likely salient. Gershowitz notes in addition
that litigation over capital sentencing has changed significantly
over the past generation.24 Only a constantly updating model will
ensure that relevant factors are assessed. Unlike with long-term
predictions about the weather, prior data should be relevant for
predicting when best to plea bargain pre or post trial. For
predictive analytics to succeed, we must be able to extract
sufficient relevant data from the information available.25
Finally, to some extent, relevant data can only be ascertained
if a baseline of accuracy exists so that a decision-maker can
determine whether analytics based on the relevant factors lead to
a sound prediction. With weather, we can measure success by
comparing weather conditions to what was predicted based on
different models; with life insurance companies, it is a simple
matter to determine whether their risk assessment panned out.
In public law contexts, however, it may be more difficult to agree
on a benchmark because the political costs of agreeing to
22. See generally Harold J. Krent & Scott Morris, Inconsistency and Angst
in District Court Resolution of Social Security Disability Appeals, 67 HASTINGS
L. J. 367 (2016).
23. See Katz, supra note 14, at 959–61 (“Even under fairly ideal conditions,
weather is a hard prediction problem and our best success is obtained within
small time windows around the given event.”).
24. See Gershowitz, supra note 1, at 1363 n.15, 1366 n.27 (noting some of
the specific ways the litigation has changed).
25. Supposedly, one of the failures of the Total Information Awareness
project launched by Admiral Poindexter after 9/11 was the difficulty in
identifying relevant data. Q&A on the Pentagon’s “Total Information Awareness”
Program, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/qa-pentagons-total-informationawareness-program?redirect=cpredirect/15578 (last visited Feb. 9, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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sentences less than those approved by the jury or sentencing
judge are so hard to measure. Moreover, in the context of
post-trial plea bargaining, as in all settlements, the
decision-maker never is sure what would have happened had the
bargain not taken place.26 At a minimum, however, greater
consistency in decision-making can be assured, and a governor
can assess over time the extent to which litigation costs have
lessened.
III. No Right to an Individualized Determination
Although algorithms can be fashioned to create insurance
markets and help with litigation costs, use of probabilistic data to
assess eligibility for government benefits or leniency programs
may be problematic.
For example, roughly two million applications for social
security disability are filed each year. The agency must
determine if each applicant is disabled based on a complicated
grid that focuses on the applicant’s continuing ability to perform
gainful employment in the economy.27 The agency must consider
age, physical and psychological symptoms, interactivity of
symptoms, employment history and so forth. Assessing whether
an individual is disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act is time consuming, expensive, and has led to widely
disparate decisions across the country.28 How attractive it would
be instead to cull information from the Social Security
Administration (SSA) or the National Institutes of Health to
create an algorithm to determine the likelihood that someone
with similar conditions and age can pursue gainful employment
26. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Noise: How to Overcome the High, Hidden
Cost of Inconsistent Decision Making, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2016),
https://hbr.org/2016/10/noise (last visited Feb. 4, 2017) (discussing generally, not
just in the legal context, how irrelevant information must be limited to produce
decisions without wrong results) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
27. HAROLD J. KRENT & SCOTT MORRIS, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, ACHIEVING GREATER CONSISTENCY IN SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
ADJUDICATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY AND SUGGESTED REFORMS 1–3 (Apr. 3, 2013),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Achieving_Greater_Consisten
cy_Final_Report_4-3-2013_clean.pdf.
28. Id. at 14–33.
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despite the setback(s). The algorithm could be tested on prior
cases to determine whether it predicts disability effectively as
measured by the rubrics established by the agency, or it could be
tested against the assessment of experts. If the algorithm could
predict disability with a ninety percent success rate, massive
amounts of time and resources would be saved,29 and greater
consistency would be ensured. As it is, those who are denied
disability can seek a de novo hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge, and 800,000 do so every year with a forty percent or
so success rate.30 In comparison, determining disability with a
ninety percent success rate at the outset would be outstanding.
But Congress has not directed that individuals be awarded
disability on a probabilistic basis. Rather, the agency is to assess
the particular characteristics and conditions of each claimant.31
Predictive analytics cannot be the sole basis for a judgment when
individualized determinations are required by law.
Use of predictive analytics to fast track eligibility poses a
closer question⎯individuals receiving such benefits due to the
algorithm would be advantaged in receiving benefits more quickly
than others. When the algorithm did not predict disability, the
claimant still would have the same opportunity as now to
demonstrate disability before the agency through a written
hearing, with presumably less wait time. Unless Congress were
to direct that the agency assess disability on a first come first
served basis, such fast tracking in the long run would save
tremendous resources. Deployment of a probabilistic algorithm to
determine disability is promising.
Consider, as well, if the agency used predictive analytics to
determine which recipients of disability payments likely were to
improve medically to the point where they could resume gainful
29. An avenue of appeal would be available for those denied disability
based on the algorithm and, presumably the appeals system would correct—to
the extent consistent with prior practice—the error. Those erroneously granted
disability might well lose disability through the Continuing Disability Review
(CDR) process. Infra note 31.
30. Krent & Morris, supra note 22, at 14–23.
31. Due Process may mandate individuated treatment even if the
legislature has not so directed. Criminal defendants, for instance, could not be
convicted based on probabilistic notions alone; nor would Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976), permit dismissal of a governmental employee without a
hearing based on factors specific to the particular case.
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employment. The agency might single out those for Continuing
Disability Review based on predictive data. Those selected for a
hearing because of the algorithm thus would be more likely to
lose disability earlier than others who had received disability at
the same time. The agency follows a simplified form of this
approach currently,32 and a more sophisticated approach would
be entirely consistent with the statutory scheme because the
ultimate determination of disability would turn on the
characteristics of the particular claimant.33
Use of predictive analytics in the post-trial plea bargaining
context similarly would not prove problematic. Each individual
has been sentenced based, at least in part, on his or her own
conduct. To be sure, many defendants would receive the offer of a
commutation based on factors external to their criminal conduct.
Plea bargaining before trial itself, however, is based on factors
unrelated to blameworthiness, such as the expense of
prosecution, difficulty of obtaining evidence, and so forth.34
Moreover, with the exception of the commutation from the death
penalty when only the capital sentencing is challenged, the
offender can refuse the offer.
IV. Potential for Discrimination
Even when individualized treatment is not mandated by the
legislature, the use of predictive algorithms may result in
32. The agency currently classifies beneficiaries into three categories—
medical improvement not expected, medical improvement possible, and medical
improvement expected—based on 1990s data and then prioritizes within the
third category for full medical reviews. For an analysis of deficiencies in the
acquisition and analysis of data, see Alexandra Constantin, et al., Data-Driven
Solutions for Improving the Continuing Disability Review Process, in IDEAS TO
STRENGTHEN THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 142–50
(2016) [hereinafter IDEAS TO STRENGTHEN].
33. Congress could also fashion a transitional term of disability for those
who are most likely to improve medically based on probabilistic data. See, e.g.,
Kim Hildred, Pamela Mazerski, Harold J. Krent & Jennifer Christian,
Transitional Benefits for a Subset of the Social Security Disability Insurance
Population, in IDEAS TO STRENGTHEN, supra note 32, at 337.
34. Because of the focus on external factors, the potential for
discrimination arises, although there have been no studies, of which I am
aware, suggesting that plea bargaining has resulted in discrimination. See also
infra notes 37–38 (addressing subjectivity in the clemency context).
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discrimination against an individual, in essence disadvantaging
him or her for being a member of a group. When the state bases
predictive analytics on data correlated with gender, race, or other
protected category, discrimination can occur.
A case in point lies in the evidence-based sentencing adopted
by over twenty states.35 That approach relies in part on data
drawn from factors extrinsic to the individual’s conduct, such as
socioeconomic status and level of education, to estimate the
chance of recidivism. To the extent such factors are linked with
race, so will the predicted level of recidivism even when the prior
conduct viewed in isolation does not so indicate. In other words,
predictive data can “bake in” discrimination due to reliance on
factors outside the individual’s own past conduct, and judges may
use such factors without realizing that they are thereby
departing from a sentencing system based on moral dessert.
Viewed another way, probabilities based on factors outside the
individual’s control can result in discrimination, even though
subjective factors also may be determinative in the recidivism
decisions reached by judges without the benefit of data. The risks
of each must be considered in designing how best to reach
recidivism predictions.
Indeed, ProPublica recently released a study of risk
assessment for recidivism assigned to 7,000 people arrested in
Broward County, Florida, in 2013–14.36 The data revealed that
race played a substantial factor in the recidivism projection,
which then led to longer sentences for African Americans who
committed similar offenses to whites. ProPublica tentatively
concluded that the questions Florida law enforcement authorities
asked about socio-economic and demographic conditions, such as
whether a parent had been in jail or the number of people known
to have used illegal drugs, play a substantial role in the sentences
handed out. The study highlights the importance of
transparency⎯the factors underlying predictive analytics can
35. See Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific
Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 805 (2014) (examining
the effects of evidence based sentencing).
36. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
www.propublic.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminalsentencing (last visited Feb. 9, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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shape the prediction and should in public law contexts be shared
with the public when possible.37 Although there has been no
similar study of the net cast by the No-Fly List, few would be
surprised if the list disproportionately targeted those with Middle
Eastern backgrounds in comparison to others who posed a similar
risk of violence based solely on their prior actions.
In the commutation context, subjective factors could
conceivably result in discrimination. After all, the President’s
pardon power embraces discretion, and has so historically.38
Discrimination based on race, gender, and other characteristics
likely has entered into the calculus—even President Lincoln
allegedly showed favoritism to residents of Kentucky.39 But, in
calling for greater use of the commutation power in death penalty
cases, Gershowitz confines his analysis to situations in which
litigation costs would be substantial, a relatively neutral criterion
that is not likely to lead to discrimination.
Conclusion
Utilization of predictive analytics will burgeon with time.
The benefits of quantitative legal prediction are many, and the
potential savings to government bureaucracy and private
business alike, huge. Governments as well as private businesses
should be able to learn from the sine qua non of the insurance
industry⎯data from the past can be mined to predict the future,
37. The furor over the factors that led to placing individuals on the “no-fly
list” is a case in point. Transparency argues strongly for disclosure of the
factors, but disclosure of some might tip off potential terrorists. See, e.g.,
Stephen Dinan, FBI No-fly List Revealed 81,000 Names, but Fewer than 1,000
are
Americans,
WASH.
TIMES
(June
20,
2016),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/20/fbi-no-fly-list-revealed-81knames-fewer-1k-us/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2017) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
38. See, e.g., HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 189–94 (2005)
(summarizing how presidents have granted clemency for different reasons).
39. Id. at 203; see also Lois Beckett & Robin Respaut, Racial Disparity in
Presidential Pardons: What Can Be Done?, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 7, 2011),
https://www.propublica.org/article/racial-disparity-in-presidential-pardonswhat-can-be-done (last visited Feb. 9, 2017) (discussing the role race plays in the
presidential pardons process) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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and subjectivity in decision-making, minimized. As long as there
is sufficient relevant data, predictive analytics can help
government decision-makers allocate scarce resources, as
Gershowitz recommends, even though there may be insufficient
data in the death penalty context he addresses.
That being said, two cautionary notes are appropriate in
deploying predictive analytics in public law. Individuated
decision-making may be required either under the Constitution
or pertinent laws, thus preventing reliance on predictive
analytics, even where it would be fiscally prudent to do so.
Second, even where reliance on external data seems appropriate,
consideration of those factors may result in discrimination. Thus,
government actors must be careful if relying on characteristics
more prevalent among protected groups than others when
making predictions affecting individual rights. After all,
predictive analytics is just a technologically more sophisticated
way of describing profiling.

